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HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES AND
UNION-NONUNION PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES
ABSTRACT
Many researchers in both economics departments and business schools
recently
have become interested in examining how much ofan effect human resource
decisions and policies have on firm performance. Thispaper surveys the
literature on unionism and productivity and discusses itsimplications for
future research on more general issues. The main focus ison (I) conclusions
as to whether unions raise or lower productivity and (2)procedures used to
identify the channels through which unions affect productivity.
The studies of unions and productivity have documented
large productivity
differences between seemingly comparable union and nonunionestablishments. In
many cases unionism is associated with higher productivity, especially when
unionized firms are in a competitive environnent.However, the mechanisms
responsible for union-nonunion productivity differences in eachstudy remain
poorly understood, either because detailed information on how unions affected
company decisions was not available or because the available information
produced inconclusive results. These conclusionssuggest that human resource
policies can have a very large effect on financialoutcomes, but our ability to
estimate the magnitude of that effect for a particularpolicy is currently very
limited.
Steven C. Allen
Department of Economics and Business
North Carolina State University
Box 8110
Raleigh, NC 27695-8110In mainstream economic theory, unions are viewed mainly aswage-raising
institutions. Managers respond to higher wages by cutting back or shutting
down operations that are no longer profitable. Beyond this, they takesteps to
offset the cost of higher wages by substituting capital for labor and
increasing the skill level of the work force through adjustments in training
and hiring procedures. The result is greater observed productivity in union
than nonunion establishments. Despite the productivity gains, econonists view
union-generated wage increases as socially undesirable because in theory the
cost of higher wages is never completely offset by additional productivity,
resulting in greater unit costs and reduced output. Unions further reduce
output and productivity through strikes and restrictive work practices.
This itandard view has been challenged over the last dozen years by work
initiated by Professors Richard Freeman and James Medoff of Harvard University.
Drawing from Hirschman's (1970) "exit-voice" model, Freeman and Medoff (1984)
argued that unions should be viewed as institutions that give workers voice at
the workplace. Union voice can result in increased productivity through a
variety of mechanisms -- reducedturnover, more informal training and
information sharing among workers, better communication between workers and
management, and improved morale. It can also have a "shock effect" on
management, the result of which is that decision making becomes more sensitive
to worker reactions (Slichter, Healy and Livernash, 1960).
There is now a sizable empirical literature examining the effect of unions
on productivity. This literature is highly relevant for understanding the
impact of human resource policies on firm performance for two reasons. First,
despite the sharp drop in union organizing success, the question of what is
likely to happen to a f inn if it becomes unionized remains a very important
issue. Faced with the threat of unionization, managers must judge whether thecosts of becoming organized are greater than the costs of attempting to remain
nonunion. Today in the private sector it is quite clear that almost all
managers believe the costs of becoming organized are greater. However, there
is evidence that managerial views on this question were quite different in the
l940s (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie (1986)) and one should not totally discount
the possibility that these views may change again in the future.
Second, many of the studies in the literature on unions and productivity
(Ui') attempt to identify the key mechanisms causing any observed productivity
differences, a central issue in the new literature on human resources and firm
performance(HRFP). Because the focus is almost always on human resource
practices, the UP studies end up asking exactly the same types of questions as
the HRFP studies, as one can see from the surveys of the HRFP literature in
Kleiner j. (1987). Not only does the UP literature provide a set of
"preliminary results," but also it points out the difficulties in obtaining
useful conclusions about the impact of human resource practices.
After a suary of the key mechanisms through which unions affect
productivity, this paper surveys the UP literature. The survey focuses on (1)
conclusions as to whether unions raise or lower productivity and (2) studies
that attempt to identify channels through which unions affect productivity.
The last section of the paper assesses what is currently known about unions and
productivity and discusses useful future research directions for both the UP
and HRFP literatures.
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I. HOW UNIONS INFLUENCE PRODUCTIVITY
One important route through which unions influence productivity has
already been noted in the introduction: higher union wages create an incentive
to find substitutes for labor. This is but one of many channels through which
a union can influence the productivity of an establishment. A newly unionized
establishment is likely to witness across-the-board changes in its human
resource policies, especially those dealing with hiring, promotion, layoffs,
training, and planning. The adjustments in compensation practices will be much
more complex than a simple change in the overall wage level. Unionized firms
tend to have relatively small occupational and geographical wage differentials.
They also tend to spend a larger share of their compensation package on
employee benefits and a smaller share on pay linked to individual or group
performance. Management behavior also changes under unionism. In the short
run, one must consider the initial shock effect of union organization, the
constraints spelled out by the current contract, union recourse under grievance
procedures, and the desire for peaceful settlement of future contracts. Over a
longer time horizon, policies toward union cooperation or union avoidance often
turn out to be a key element in corporate strategy.
Some of the most salient features of unionism that are believed to
influence productivity are summarized in Table 1. This table is not intended
to be all inclusive, nor does each factor listed in the table apply to every
organization. The table should be viewed as merely a reflection of how today's
economists think unions affect productivity. Although there is much more to
this thinking than the simple textbook tale about factor substitution, it is
useful to emphasize the distinction between productivity changes arising from
higher wage levels and productivity changes arising from sources other than4
wage levels. This is done in the table by indicating whether the main source
of a particular channel of union influence is wage (W) or nonwage (N). Because
one would naturally expect unions to raise productivity through higher wage
levels, every UP study attempts to control for wage-induced changes in capital
intensity and skill levels. HRFP studies will also have to make this
distinction whenever the HR practice under examination is correlated with the
wage level.
Both the wage and nonwage channels of union influence should result in a
workforce with an upgraded skill level. Higher union wage levels give managers
the incentive to raise hiring standards and cut back on unskilled labor, With
the higher wage there is also generally a queue of workers wanting jobs,
enabling firms to make these adjustments without extra recruiting expenditures.
Higher union wages reduce turnover, thereby increasing the incentive to spend
more on training. Freeman (1980a) has shown that the overall reduction in
turnover under unionism is much larger than one would expect from higher union
wages. He attributes this turnover reduction to the greater voice unions give
employees in workplace decision making. With voice at the workplace, union
members are less likely to quit their jobs when they are unhappy with working
conditions or human resource policies, leading to even more training under
unionism. Another factor leading to more investments in training under
unionism is the continued reliance in sectors such as construction on an
occupational mix molded by craft traditions, with apprenticeship remaining the
key route of entry into the craft. A final reason to expect workers in
unionized establishments to be more highly skilled than their nonunion
equivalents is the greater cost of false positive errors in hiring decisions.Managers are likely to raise their hiring standards in order to offset union-
imposed restrictions on job assignments, layoffs and dismissals.
If work effort is a simple matter of carrots and sticks, thenone would
naturally expect unions to be a negative factor. The use of seniority in
making promotion decisions in unionized establishments is well known.Many
nonunion establishments base their promotions on seniority as well (Abrahamand
Medoff, 1985). This does not mean that union and nonunion carrots for
promotion are identical. Compensation packages under unionism tend to have
highly compressed occupational wage differentials (Freeman, 1980b, 1982). The
spread in compensation among different jobs is further compressed by thelarge
share of the package which goes to health insurance, retirementplans, and paid
time off (Freeman, 1981). Another factor thatmay diminish the size of the
union carrot is the less frequent use of meritpay and other incentive pay
mechanisms, although this requires the controversial and empirically
questionable (Ehrenberg and Milkovich (1987)) assumption that suchpay systems
actually influence employee behavior in the desired fashion.
Two other key mechanisms through which unions are believed to reduce work
effort are work rules and grievance procedures. Work rules, both written and
unwritten, result in too many jobs and too much break time, accompanied by
restrictions on output levels and management's ability toget the job done in
the most efficient manner. Crievances undermine productivityby reducing the
penalty for shirking and by protecting incompetent and dishonest workers.
Once one goes beyond this no-carrots/no-sticks scenario to examine other
factors believed to influence work effort, a different pictureemerges. Some
of the very factors listed above as decreasing productivity under unionism from
a carrots/sticks framework turn out, when viewed from a different perspective,
S6
also to be factors leading to increased productivity. For instance, compressed
pay structures and promotion and layoff by seniority reduce the incentives for
rivalry in the workplace and make it easier to promote cooperation among
workers. Limitations on the ability of supervisors to discharge make employees
feel more like long-term stakeholders, thereby encouraging them to be more
committed to their employer.
The "exit-voice" model is also relevant for work effort. Freeman and
Medoff (1984) argue that unions are essential if employees are to have a true
voice in the work place. One obvious reason that unions are viewed as
essential for voicing worker concerns is fear. In a nonunion setting, a worker
who speaks out about workplace issues at a minimum risks being labelled as
noncooperative and at a maximum risks losing his job. Another reason is that
working conditions, human resource policies and the behavior of managers are
what economists call "public goods," conditions that everyone in the workplace
"consumes." No public good, whether it be national defense or occupational
safety, will be provided in adequate amounts by voluntary, individual behavior
because the individual bears all the costs and must share the benefits with
everyone else. The economically rational individual will instead wait for
someone else to speak out about public goods at the workplace, the result being
an inadequate flow of information to management about worker concerns. Workers
will speak out only when the costs of doing so are offset by the expected
benefits to them as individuals. The collective institution of unionism can
get around this problem in theory by sharing the costs of voice behavior
equally across all workers, changing the decision rule to a tradeoff between
group benefits and group costs.7
Unions send messages to managers through informal day-to-day interaction
as well as through formal grievance procedures and contract negotiations. Many
nonunion firms have attempted to put their own grievance systems into place,
but unless such systems are subject to outside arbitration or a balanced review
panel containing both workers and managers, workers still may view such systems
as an extension of management and use them infrequently. As a result, managers
in unionized workplaces are likely to be better informed, which should increase
productivity. Workers are also more likely to make suggestions for
productivity improvements when bargaining allows the gains to be shared between
the firm and the workforce. Grievances and contract negotiations also give
workers a voice in how the workplace is run. If more voice at the workplace
raises morale, productivity is even further enhanced. Needless tosay, many
managers dispute this theory, pointing out cases where unions have created
conflict where none previously existed and other cases where dissatisfaction
with the union resulted in reduced efficiency.
The response of management to unionization is a critical factor in
determining the influence of unions on productivity. Slichter, Healy, and
Livernash and Clark (l9BOb) note that in many cases there are often dramatic
changes in managerial practices when a plant becomes covered by a collective
bargaining agreement. There is a greater reliance on company or plant policy
in making decisions and less reliance on the judgment of any individual
manager. When policies are not applicable or when developing policies,
management becomes more likely to think through the consequences of any
decisions and make appropriate adjustments. The emphasis on policy and
accountability often spreads to other areas of decision making, such as
production scheduling and quality control. There are also usually some8
personnel changes; frequently the plant manager is replaced and supervisors are
either replaced or retrained.
Any productivity gains obtained from more professional managerial
techniques can be offset by the reduction in flexibility which inevitably takes
place under unionism. Union and nonunion managers alike almost always claim
that the biggest advantage to remaining nonunion is flexibility. Occupational
jurisdictions and contract provisions limit the ability of managers to
optimally assign workers to jobs. Fluctuations in the demand for labor result
in further inefficiencies as unions limit managerial discretion in layoffs,
overtime, and subcontracting. However, many nonunion firms voluntarily follow
policies that are just as "inflexible" as those followed in their unionized
counterparts. These include promises to workers that they will not be laid off
and de facto seniority rules for promotions.
Unions can also influence the amount of resources the firm allocates to
managerial tasks. For instance, lower turnover under unionism reduces
recntiting, hiring, and training costs; the union even performs a number of
personnel functions in industries such as shipping and construction. However,
higher union wages also imply a queue of applicants that must be screened more
carefully because of union-imposed restrictions on the right to dismiss or
reassign.
A final factor behind any observed union-nonunion productivity differences
is technology. In a static context, the direction of union impact is unclear.
Managers have an incentive to use a less labor-intensive technology to offset
the higher wages, but union work rules may limit this type of adjustment. Over
a longer time horizon, managers must trade off the gains from R&D oriented9
toward further reductions in labor intensity against the risk that the union
will be able to expropriate such gains at the bargaining table.
As the above discussion and the accompanying table indicate, it is hard to
draw any general conclusions about the overall impact of unions on productivity
from a purely theoretical discussion. The research question that various
studies have tried to address is to determine the net effect of the nonwage
channels of union influence discussed above, If they show no change or a
reduction in productivity, then the institution of unionism is clearly
undesirable on economic grounds (although not necessarily on the grounds of
equality and social cohesion). If the influence is positive, it is important
to learn whether the productivity gains are large enough to offset the output
losses associated with higher wages. Regardless of whether the effect is
positive or negative, it is also important to determine whether the sources of
the productivity gains can be isolated so the forces that determine
productivity at the workplace can be better understood.
II. EVIDENCE ON OVERALL UNION IMPACT
To estimate the impact of unions on productivity through channels other
than increased wages, the procedure most commonly used in the UP literature is
to estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function where the intercept is allowed
to vary with unionization. The usual specification is an OLS regression of the
log of output per hour or employee on the log of the capital-labor ratio, some
control variables for labor quality, and a unionization variable. Two types of
data have been used in these studies. Brown and Medoff (1978) and Allen (1984)10
use Census data broken down by two-digit industry and state or region,
supplemented by data on percentage union members and labor quality from the
public use tapes for the Current Population Survey. This type of data set has
been widely used by economists to study such issues as the effect of education
on productivity and the substitutability of labor for capital. The advantage
of using such data is that they are comprehensive, reasonably accurate, and
readily available in the government documents section of the campus library.
All other studies use some type of micro data, usually collected from
establishments. These data sets generally contain information on more
variables than the Census reports and the results are free of any possible
aggregation bias created by arbitrary state by industry classifications of
heterogeneous establishments.
The productivity measure used in the earliest studies is value added
(dollar value of output minus expenditures for materials) per hour or employee.
Most studies done in the l980s have used some physical measure of output. In
theory the value added concept allows the researcher to compare output and
productivity levels across different industries or within an industry where
there is considerable product differentiation.
In practice there are two difficulties with using value added as an output
measure in a UP study. The main difficulty is that prices of homogeneous goods
and hedonic price functions of heterogeneous goods vary over establishments,
geographic location, and time. This requires some type of price deflation to
make sure that the variation in value added reflects output variation rather
than price variation. A related concern is that value added not only equals
the value of output to buyers, but also equals the cost of labor and capital to
producers. Higher union wages translate into higher labor costs as long as11
labor demand is sufficiently insensitive. Critics of the UP studies often
claim that the studies are actually reporting wage equations, not productivity
equations.
In practice this claim seems to be totally unsubstantiated. The union-
nonunion wage difference, generally believed to be in the neighborhood of 15
percent, is much smaller than the productivity difference reported in many of
the studies. Also, some studies report results for both value added and some
physical measure of output. The results show no tendency to obtain
systematically larger estimates of productivity gains under unionism when
output is measured in terms of value added. This concern about possible
systematic upward bias seems to have unnecessarily limited the scope of recent
UP studies to markets where output can be measured in physical terms.
Turning from methodology to results, there seem to be three main
conclusions from the private sector UP studies summarized in Table 2. The most
striking conclusion is that many studies tend to find productivity to be higher
under unionism, even after one controls for the greater capital and skill
intensity of unionized workplaces. This implies that there are sizable
productivity gains associated with the voice and shock effects discussed above
and that the productivity losses associated with union work rules, reduced
management flexibility, and no-carrots/no-sticks are relatively small.
Brown and Medoff (1978) was the first published study to show productivity
to be higher under unionism. They found that in 1972, productivity in
unionized manufacturing establishments was as much as 25 percent higher than in
nonunion settings. Work done by Jonathan Leonard reported in Freeman and
Medoff (1984) replicated this finding for 1977. Further substantiating
evidence was provided in Frantz's (1976) study of the furniture industry. All12
of these studies used value added as their output measure. Clark (1980a,b)
found similar conclusions in the cement industry in both a cross section study
based on 1973-1976 data and a before-after comparison of productivity in six
plants unionized between 1953 and 1976. Clark was the first to report results
where output was measured in physical units (tons of Portland cement).
Two manufacturing studies found no union-nonunion productivity difference:
Clark's (1984) study of lines of business in 902 large corporations and Kaufman
and Kaufman's (1987) study of 37 auto parts manufacturing plants. Almost all
of Clark's sample consists of Fortune 1000 companies, whereas other studies
examine firms of all sizes. If the union productivity advantage found in other
studies is limited to smaller organizations, then his results could still be
consistent with studies finding a positive overall union productivity effect.
Another possible explanation for the difference between Clark's results and
those of Brown and Medoff is that tiP studies are very sensitive to different
aggregation techniques. It is instructive to note that Clark's study also
finds that unions reduce profit rates in unconcentrated industries but not in
concentrated industries, exactly opposite to the pattern found in other studies
of unionization and profitability using Census and stock market data. Further
work is needed to determine the role played by aggregation and sample
restrictions based on firm size in generating these two very different sets of
results for manufacturing. It is more difficult to pinpoint possible
explanations for the findings of Kaufman and Kaufman, except to note that there
is no reason to expect unions to be associated with higher productivity in
every setting.
Finally, Bemmels (1988) finds productivity to be 32 percent lower in
unionized plants in manufacturing. This finding is based on 46 responses13
generated from a survey of 1,000 firms, raising questions about the
representativeness of the sample. The results also imply an implausibly low
estimate of capital's share of output. Despite these limitations, this is the
only UP study based on recent data.
The second main conclusion is that the impact of unionism on productivity
varies with product market structure. This is shown very strikingly in my
studies (1986a, 1986b, l988b) of various types of construction projects. In
private sector work, the productivity of union contractors is much greater than
that of nonunion contractors, whereas there is no significant union-nonunion
productivity difference in projects completed for the public sector. These are
the same unions and the same contractors. In the hospital and nursing home
sample, they are the same types of structures. Two key reasons for the
difference in the results seem to be inadequate pressures for cost minimization
in the public sector and prevailing wage laws that effectively prevent
competition from nonunion contractors in many markets.
The third main conclusion is that the impact of unionism on productivity
can change dramatically over time. Connerton, Freeman, and Medoff (1983) found
that in 1965 productivity of union mines in the bituminous coal industry was 25
to 30 percent greater than that of nonunion mines. A mere ten years later,
productivity in union mines was 20 to 25 percent lower. They attribute this
largely to changes in the leadership of the United Mine Workers (UMW) union.
Until 1960 the union was run by John L. Lewis. Operations were centralized and
internal dissent was not tolerated. After Lewis' retirement there was frequent
turnover in union leadership (including the conviction of union president Tony
Boyle for ordering the murder of his opponent Joseph Yablonski) and a breakdown
in discipline, reflected in a rapid increase in the number of wildcat strikes.14
The union productivity advantage has also declined substantially in the
construction industry. My l988a study shows that for the entire industry union
productivity was about 20 percent higher than nonunion productivity in 1972,
but a statistically insignificant 6 and 8 percent higher in 1977 and 1982. A
key factor behind this change seems to be the rising share of union members
working for nonunion contractors, which has offset the lack of training
possessed by most nonunion workers. In both bituminous coal and construction,
the market share of unionized establishments has declinedsubstantially as one
would expect when higher wages are no longer offset by higherproductivity.
Only one study has been done of the impact of unions in the service
sector. Craddy and Hall (1985) compared productivity of the 30 banking
establishments unionized in 1982 with e matched sample of 30 nonunion banks.
They found productivity to be 11 percent lower in the unionized banks.
Even in cases where unionism is associated with higherproductivity, the
"bottom line" question is whether this efficiency gain is offsetby higher
union wages. The most direct way of examining this question is to estimatea
cost function, a relationship linking total costs to input prices andoutput.
The cost function evidence is mixed. My 1987 study finds thataverage cost per
square foot is about the same for office buildings constructed by union and
nonunion contractors, with union contractors having a cost advantageon large
office buildings and nonunion contractors having an advantageon smaller
projects. The same study found nonunion contractors had a cost advantage in
school and hospital construction. In retail construction,my 1988b study found
roughly equal costs for union and nonunion contractors. Cost studies have also
been done for hospitals. Salkever (1982) and Sloan and Adamache (1984) both
find unionism associated with higher costs.15
Indirect cost estimates can be obtained by comparing the union effects on
productivity and wages as long as information is available on labor's share of
total costs. Estimates of the impact of unions on wages almost always come
from data on individual workers, whereas the productivity results are based on
establishments or Census aggregates of establishments. Lewis concludes that
estimates of union-nonunion wage gaps based on aggregated data "substantially
overestimate" (1986, p. 45) the true union impact. Without knowing the impact
of aggregation on the productivity gap estimates, comparisons of wage and
production equation results must be interpreted with some care. These
comparisons generally find that when unions are associated with higher
productivity, the union-nonunion wage gap is slightly larger than the
productivity gap, implying that union and nonunion costs are comparable. Of
course, in studies finding zero or negative union productivity effects, higher
union wages necessarily imply higher costs.
The most relevant "bottom line" measure from the firm's point of view is
profits. Studies of the effect of unions on profitability are surveyed in
Freeman and Medoff (1984, ch. 12) and Addison and Hirsch (1989). The profit
studies all reach the same conclusion: unions reduce profits. Whether this
reflects a transfer from owners to union members or a loss in efficiency
remains a subject of ongoing research, which is discussed very well by Addison
and Hirsch.16
III.EVIDENCE ON SOURCES OF UNIONIMPACT
The evidence sununarizeci above shows that unionization is often correlated
with higher productivity and that the impact of unionization on productivity
varies across different sectors of the economy and over time within each
sector. Yet it does not reveal any information about the mechanisms through
which these productivity adjustments take place. In fact, many of the studies
summarized above make no effort to account for the sources of the reported
union-nonunion productivity difference. In these studies unionism is nothing
more than a label on a black box, inside of which are hidden the true
mechanisms of adjustments at the workplace (Lewin and Feuille, 1983).
In defense of the "black box" studies, including Allen (1986b. 1988b),
three points should be noted. First, the reaction of most academic economists
to studies that claimed to find higher productivity under unionism (holding
skills and capital-labor ratios constant) can be best characterized as
incredulous. This meant that the authors of the earliest studies had to devote
a considerable amount of research effort to establishing the robustness of
their results to all conceivable theoretical and econometric objections. These
efforts seem to be much more appreciated within the economics profession than
in other academic circles. Second, many of the studies have relied on
secondary data sources and in many cases the party collecting the data was not
at all concerned with UP issues. In such situations it is extremely difficult
for the researcher to derive any statistical conclusions about what is going on
inside the black box. Third, it can be argued that the black box criticism
applies across all research areas in labor economics, not just the UP
literature. Why are education and experience correlated with earnings? Why
are real wages procyclical? What determines when a person will retire? Many17
other fields of research in labor economics have not advanced very far beyond
the black box stage.
One simple approach used in many UP studies to establish the mechanisms
through which unions influence productivity is to add interaction ternis between
unionization and other variables or, equivalently, to split the sample into
smaller groups and compare the union coefficients of each group. For instance,
Clark (1980a) finds that the union coefficient in cement manufacturing is
greater in the Southwest than in the South or North Central regions and is
positive for new plants but near zero for old plants. Noting the prevalence of
nonunion plants in the Southwest, Clark points out that union plants in that
region may be responding to greater competitive pressure. Another example of
this approach is my 1988a study, in which the union coefficient varies with the
percentage of union construction workers employed by nonunion contractors. The
results showed that the union productivity advantage is much smaller in areas
where a large share of union workers are employed in the open shop. This
suggests that worker characteristics such as training and experience are key
sources of the union productivity advantage in that sector. Clark (1984)
tested whether the union coefficient varied with the market share of the firm
or with percentage of the firm unionized but found that neither factor had any
impact on the size of the union coefficient. Graddy and Hall tested the impact
of the size of the bargaining unit and the maturity of the labor-management
relationship on productivity in their union sample, but once again neither
variable had any explanatory power. Other researchers have no doubt tried this
approach as well and come up emptyhanded. Estimating interaction terms thus
far has yielded a couple of useful clues about possible sources of union-
nonunion productivity differences but no hard evidence.18
An approach that would seem to be much more promising is to collect data
on the mechanisms believed to cause union-nonunion productivity differences and
add these variables to the model. This is based on the premise that the union
productivity effect varies within the sample and that some of this variation
reflects differences across both union and nonunion firms in such causal
variables as turnover, job satisfaction, communication, and management. In
theory one could account for how much of the union productivity advantage
results from a particular variable by observing the change in the union
coefficient when that variable is added to the model. For instance, suppose
that differences in job satisfaction fully account for the union-nonunion
productivity difference in a particular sample. Then when this variable is
added to the model, the union coefficient should become zero.
This approach was first used by Brown and Medoff to determine how much of
their estimated union productivity advantage could be explained in terms of
reduced turnover. When they added the quit rate to their model, the union
coefficient dropped from .205 to .160, indicating that lower turnover accounts
for 22 percent of the overall effect and that other factors (communication,
morale, management, etc.) account for the remainder.
In their study of the coal industry, Connerton, Freeman, and Medoff
compared the growth in strikes across different states to productivity growth,
finding that productivity declined the most in states where strikes increased
most rapidly.
I have also used this approach in two of my studies of the construction
industry. In my 1984 study using Census data, I added the ratio of production
workers to total employment and the fraction of workers who have completed
apprenticeships to the model. The first variable was meant crudely to adjust19
for changes in the occupational structure (a control for observable labor
quality associated with experience and education was already in the model)1
whereas the second reflected training practices. These two variables accounted
for 15 to 27 percent of the union effect on productivity.
The data set analyzed in Allen (1986a) was collected by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics to measure and analyze productivity in the construction
industry. A likely source of some of the union productivity advantage in
office building construction was lower supervisory requirements. To test this,
I added the ratio of supervisor to total hours and found this accounted for 10
percent of the union effect.
A unique aspect of this data set was that the interviewers asked the
general contractors questions about the impact of seven different factors on
productivity in their project: weather, strikes, building codes, apprenticeship
programs, prefabricated components, standardized components, and supply of
skilled workers. Although this battery of questions ignores some obviously
important factors, one would think ex ante that some of this information would
help identify the underlying sources of higher union productivity.
Ex post this information turned out to be nearly useless. There turned
out to be very little difference between the responses of union and nonunion
contractors."No effect" was by far the most common response for every factor
on the survey. The factor that seemed to have the biggest impact on
productivity in the contractors' minds was the weather, especially among union
contractors (for reasons unknown). Complicating matters further was the
finding that when each factor was added to the model, its coefficient almost
always turned out to be zero. The only reportable result I obtained from this
analysis was a finding that the greater tendency among union contractors to20
report that standardized components raised productivity accounted for as much
as 8 percent of the overall effect. Combining this with the supervisor ratio
and two other variables (ratio of unskilled and semiskilled hours to total
hours and dollar volume of office building construction), I was able to
"explain" 26 percent of the overall union effect.
Kaufman and Kaufman also tried this approach and came up emptyhanded.
Their study probed into eight different personnel policies: grievances,
promotions, layoffs, restrictive work rules, job reassignment during slack
periods, work by supervisors, job posting systems, and profit-sharing. They
found union plants made greater use of seniority in promotions and layoffs and
were more likely to have restrictive work rules, grievance systems, and job
posting systems. Union plants were less likely to have profit sharing plans
and managers in those plants had less ability to reassign workers or use
supervisors. Ho one should find any of these conclusions especially
surprising. What is a bit shocking, however, is that none of these policy
variables were at all related to productivity. Granted the sample size was
small (30 plants for this part of the analysis), but it is naive to think that
anyone looking into these issues is going to have the CPS-esque luxury of
thousands of observations.
The only other way to determine the sources of union productivity effects
besides statistical probing is that old, familiar business school standby -.
thecase study. The case study will rarely produce quantitative evidence, but
it holds some promise in regard to its ability to determine whether a
particular channel of union effect has played an important role in a particular
situation. To explain his before-after finding that unionization raises
productivity by 6 to 8 percent, Clark (l980b) interviewed union officials and21
management. His interviews successfully isolated changes in personnel
practices. When they were nonunion, plants tended to have no formal grievance
procedures (and thus very few grievances); promotions, layoffs, and recalls
were made by foremen using unspecified criteria. This all changed in a
predictable fashion after unionization.
Clark found substantial changes in management. In each case a new plant
manager was brought in and foremen were either replaced or retrained. In most
plants, formal methods of organizational control were introduced. This usually
involved setting production targets, followed by reviewing and assessing actual
performance. One plant manager noted that "...beforethe union this place was
run like a family; now we run it like a business." Clark concludes that these
changes were one of the "key adjustments to unionization."
Clark's findings about changes in workers' behavior point out another
potential limitation of the case study approach. Unable to collect before-
after data on turnover, absenteeism, worker attitudes, or discipline problems,
Clark had nothing to draw on except interviews with union and management
representatives. He found no solid evidence of any change in turnover or
absenteeism, whereas union and management views concerning changes in morale
often differed.
IV. ASSESSMENT AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The UP literature has documented large productivity differences between
seemingly comparable union and nonunion establishments. The sign and the22
magnitude of the estimated differences vary considerably across different
studies. Evidence indicates that unionized establishments are most likely to
have a productivity advantage when they must compete on equal terms with the
nonunion sector. The two studies that have examined unionism and productivity
from a dynamic standpoint have both found the estimated union-nonunion
difference to have changed dramatically over time in a direction unfavorable to
the competitive position of unionized establishments.
Faced with this evidence, it would seem very difficult to deny that
differences in the human resource practices and policies must be at least
partly responsible for these productivity differences. This is a very
encouraging signal for the HRFP literature. The prospect that human resource
management can generate productivity changes of as much as 25 percent should be
sufficient to motivate and support HRFP research.
Nonetheless, I think it would be fair to say that most academic labor
economists today remain far from convinced that such a conclusion can be drawn
from the UP literature. A detailed critique is provided by Addison and Hirsch.
Here I will focus on what I believe to be the two most serious contentions.
One reason behind this skepticism is that information about labor quality in
the UP literature is usually limited to occupational mix, schooling, and
experience. If this were all employers really needed to know about the
potential contribution of a job applicant, they would not have to spend any
resources on screening. Of course, we all know that employers learn much more
than this about all applicants and employees. This information, known to the
employer but not to the person analyzing the data, is usually referred to as
unobservable labor quality. The problem this poses for the UP literature is
that under the greater competitive restraint imposed by higher wages, managers23
in the union sector should tend to hire more productive individuals than those
in the nonunion sector. Thus, some of any estimated union productivity
advantage is likely to be attributable to unobservable labor quality.
The issue is "how much?" The estimated union-nonunion productivity
difference has not been at all sensitive to the inclusion of observable labor
quality control variables in any UP study. If the estimates are not sensitive
to factors such as schooling, experience, and occupation, it is very hard to
believe they will be more sensitive to some missing variable. Observable human
capital variables generally explain as much as half the interpersonal variation
in wages. Are we to believe that unobservables explain a much larger fraction
of interestablishment differences in productivity?
Selectivity bias is another rationale given by those who discount the UP
literature. Unions presumably are successful in raising wages whenever they
organize an establishment. Some organizations adapt successfully. The data
sets used in the UP studies generally do not contain information on those that
do not. As a result, the estimated productivity level of unionized
establishments is biased upward.
This criticism can be questioned on both theoretical and empirical
grounds. Theoretically, selection bias can operate in either direction. The
case outlined above is one of positive selection bias where the "best plants"
are the ones that get organized. Yet from a logical standpoint, one must also
admit the possibility of negative selection bias where the "worst plants" get
organized, in which case the union-nonunion productivity difference is
underestimated by OLS regressions. Most experts on union organizing campaigns
will tell you that today it is the "worst plants" that stand the best chance of
getting organized. Whether this was true fifty years ago when CIO-affiliated24
unions were organizing the likes of U.S. Steel and Ford is more questionable.
The observed distribution of union and nonunion establishments in any data set
is a byproduct of selection processes from different historical periods. Their
overall direction is uncertain.
Empirically, note that Clark obtained exactly the same results in simple
cross section and longitudinal analysis in his studies of cement industry
productivity. This is difficult to reconcile with pronounced selectivity bias.
More fundamentally, many studies of the union wage effect have attempted to
isolate a positive selectivity bias in OLS wage equations generated by the same
process that supposedly has biased the UP literature. These studies,
summarized in Lewis (1986), have failed to produce any agreement about not only
whether the bias is small or large but also whether it is positive or negative.
Even if one accepts the conclusion that the UP literature has firmly
established that human resource management practices can generate large
productivity differences, the one discouraging signal for the HElP literature
is the extremely limited knowledge that has been obtained about the mechanisms
through which human resource policies and outcomes affect productivity. The UP
literature has produced quantitative evidence that productivity is related to
supervision and training in construction and turnover in manufacturing. In
each case, however, most of the union-nonunion productivity difference remains
unexplained. All other studies that have attempted to obtain quantitative
evidence about sources of union-nonunion productivity differences have been
unsuccessful. Clark (1980b) obtained some useful conclusions about the impact
of unionization on management from interviews, but even here one is left with
the question of which was more important -- changesin managerial techniques or25
changes in managerial personnel? Recall also that the interview approach was
poorly suited for learning about changes in worker behavior.
To some extent this dearth of conclusions can be attributed to faulty
experimental design. One can point in some cases to the use of secondary data
sources; in others, to inadequate resources for primary data collection or the
inherent limitations of interviews. If one accepts this line of argument, it
would then be sensible to conclude that one way to increase the odds that
future studies will be more successful is to provide those doing such studies
with more resources and to direct those resources toward collecting more
quantitative data on a wider array of variables from more establishments.
This very well may be the ticket, but after reading Katz, Kochan, and
Keefe (1987), I have reservations. Katz, Kochan, and Keefe analyzed
productivity differences across 53 plants of a major automobile manufacturer in
the United States and Canada. They were able to examine how four productivity
measures (supervisors per 100 production workers, labor hours per vehicle,
adjusted labor hours, and a product quality index) were related to grievances,
absence rates, relative wage levels, local unemployment rates, and responses to
a 48-question survey on managerial discretion, pace of work, worker and union
participation, and the use of teams. The data sets used in even the best UP
studies seem spartan in comparison.
Did "more data" break open the black box? The first new challenge the
authors faced was a surplus of data, more variables than observations napped
with multicollinearity. To deal with this, they resorted to principal
components analysis to reduce 48 survey responses to four variables. This
raises the hackles of economists, who always go for Colonel Sanders and pass on
the McNuggets. Focusing on the results rather than the processing method, one26
sees that even with massive amounts of information, it is hard to establish
quantitative links between human resource management variables and "bottom
line" outcomes. The principal component reflecting management discretion and
pace of work was the only variable to be consistently related to the
productivity variables. Except for the absence rate, which was related to two
productivity variables, the other variables were either only weakly correlated
or uncorrelated with productivity.
The message here is not to belittle the final product. The findings on
managerial discretion and work pace are a very important contribution to the
literature. The point here is simply that new, bigger data sets are not a
guaranteed route to success. The key methodological message I received from
Katz, Kochan, and Keefe's study is that the linkages between human resources
and productivity are very difficult to sort out and that models that try to do
the whole job in a single step (equation) may not be up to the job.
An alternative approach to getting inside the black box is that used by
studies that focus on a specific mechanism through which unions affect
productivity but do not attempt to go further and show how that mechanism is
related to productivity in the particular sample being examined. Summaries of
selected studies are reported in Table 3; Freeman and Medoff (1984) contains a
more comprehensive set of references. These studies have shown that unions are
associated with lower turnover, higher absenteeism, less management flexibility
in staffing, more work effort, less overall job satisfaction, reduced wage
dispersion, greater employee benefits, and less investment in R&D. The
findings at this stage seem very robust; each is derived from a number of
different data sets using a variety of specifications.27
One way of integrating the results of the UP studies with those of studies
focusing on intervening variables is illustrated in Figure 1. The figure
demonstrates a simple model of how human resource policies affect firm
performance. It is not overly dissimilar front the approach used in some
textbooks on human resource management. Companies make choices about how they
hire, train, pay, and manage their workers. This in turn determines human
resource outcomes, as exhibited by easily measured variables such as labor
costs and turnover and by not so easily measured variables such as effort and
cooperation. The "bottom line" depends on the interaction of human resource
outcomes with other firm decisions (e.g., marketing) and the external
environment.
The best UP studies attempt to link productivity directly to changes in
human resource policies associated with unionization. The studies that focus
directly on the intervening variables through which unions influence firm
performance in effect attempt to link human resource outcomes to policies. One
obvious gap is that our knowledge of how these intervening variables are
related to firm performance indicators is very limited. Some progress has been
made along these lines in the studies of turnover, absenteeism, and work rules
cited in Table 3. The studies of grievance procedures summarized in Ichniowski
and Lewin (1987) are also noteworthy in this regard.
Even though the UP studies indicate that human resource policies and
outcomes have a large influence on firm performance, the challenge facing the
HRFP literature is to develop testable hypotheses that will advance the theory
well beyond what is presented in Figure 1 and to develop data sources
appropriate for testing them. Economic theories about labor markets and
employment contracts often focus on decision variables involving selection,28
compensation, supervision, and training. Sometimes the models are really
designed for welfare analysis (e.g., share economy) or to explain phenomena
that seem paradoxical to economists (e.g., wage rigidity). New models or
perhaps even the retooling of some existing models could lead to new insights
into how firms make hiring and compensation decisions.
In other cases, the empirical implications of the model are quite clear,
but appropriate data for empirical testing are not available. More data
collection funded by the government, as suggested by Hamermesh (1988), is one
route that shows promise. The development of closer linkages between academic
economists and human resource practitioners could also help in developing
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